Choiceless large cardinals and set-theoretic potentialism by Cutolo, Raffaella & Hamkins, Joel David
ar
X
iv
:2
00
7.
01
69
0v
1 
 [m
ath
.L
O]
  2
 Ju
l 2
02
0
Choiceless large cardinals and
set-theoretic potentialism
Raffaella Cutolo and Joel David Hamkins
July 6, 2020
Abstract
We define a potentialist system of ZF-structures, that is, a collection
of possible worlds in the language of ZF connected by a binary acces-
sibility relation, achieving a so called “potentialist account” of the full
background set-theoretic universe V . The definition involves Berkeley
cardinals, the strongest known large cardinal axioms, inconsistent with
the Axiom of Choice. In fact, as background theory we assume just ZF.
It turns out that the propositional modal assertions which are valid at
every world of our system are exactly those in the modal theory S4.2.
Moreover, we characterize the worlds satisfying the potentialist maxi-
mality principle, and thus the modal theory S5, both for assertions in
the language of ZF and for assertions in the full potentialist language.
1 Introduction
In the current scenario of set theory, we are faced with a conflict between large
cardinal axioms and the Axiom of Choice. In fact, there is a whole new hierar-
chy of ZF large cardinals - the Berkeley hierarchy - which contradict AC and
lie beyond the Kunen inconsistency of Reinhardt cardinals. Such “choiceless”
large cardinals have been recently introduced in [1] and the investigation of
their consistency is very involved in the present main foundational questions
concerning the universe of set theory. But let us point out something else that
is of interest here, namely: if we drop AC then the set-theoretic universe V
grows upward. This observation raises a potentialist perspective, that is, one
in which the universe of set theory reveals gradually, and never completely, as
we progressively take under consideration new fragments of it; indeed, we can
actually think of we access higher and higher parts of the set-theoretic universe
by considering stronger and stronger large cardinals.
Recent works of the second author focus on the idea of set-theoretic poten-
tialism and the analysis of the modal principles validated by specific poten-
tialist systems. The general definition is stated below.
Definition 1.1. A potentialist system is a collection W of structures in
a common language L called “worlds”, equipped with a binary accessibility
relation R, such that:
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• R is reflexive and transitive;
• whenever MRN , then M is - or embeds to - a substructure of N .
So, a potentialist system is a Kripke model of L-structures for some language
L. In order to study how truth of an assertion ϕ propagates through the
worlds of W, one adds to the basic language L the modal operators ♦ and ,
expressing, respectively, the notions of possibility and necessity :
• ♦ϕ holds at a world M (that is, “ϕ is possible over M”) if ϕ holds at
some world N such that MRN ;
• ϕ holds at a world M (that is, “ϕ is necessary over M”) if ϕ holds at
all worlds N such that MRN .
Now one can ask which propositional modal assertions are valid in the whole
system W (that is, hold in every world of W); the point is that determining
the modal validities of a potentialist system gives a precise account of how its
worlds interact with respect to their respective truths.
Let us turn to our particular case, whose hallmark is to combine choiceless
large cardinals with the potentialist ideas. Indeed, we consider the concept of
set-theoretic potentialism that arises from elementary embeddings of a tran-
sitive set into itself, where we view M as accessing N ⊇ M whenever the
restriction to M of any elementary embedding j : N → N yields an elemen-
tary embedding j′ : M → M . Such a definition of the accessibility relation
results in an interesting case as in the context of Berkeley cardinals, one can
arrange non-trivial elementary embeddings fixing any desired set. The key
point is that every given set is definable in some big transitive set and if there
is a Berkeley cardinal δ then, by definition, any transitive set M containing δ
as a member admits non-trivial elementary embeddings j : M → M , whose
critical points are in fact cofinal in δ.
Definition 1.2. A cardinal δ is a Berkeley cardinal if for every transitive
set M such that δ ∈M , and for every ordinal η < δ, there exists a non-trivial
elementary embedding j :M →M with η < crit(j) < δ.1
It turns out that the set-theoretic universe V equals the union of the worlds
of our potentialist system, and given any world M and any set a, there is a
world N accessed by M such that a ∈ N . Thus, truth in V is approximated by
truth in our worlds: we can assert any property concerning any set of V from
any of the worlds of our system by using the diamond operator, and we can
progressively move from any world to the wider perspective of another world
which is “closer” to V in that it contains additional sets and is capable to satisfy
1In the choiceless context, being non-trivial means j is not the identity on the ordinals.
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additional properties about them. The primary goal here will be to provide a
definite account and determine the valid modal principles of this kind of set-
theoretic potentialism; but let us mention that as a further perspective, maybe
one could use such a multiverse setting to investigate further the fundamental
question of the consistency of the choiceless large cardinals.
For the basics of set-theoretic potentialism and the various potentialist
systems analyzed so far refer to [4]. For more on the choiceless large cardinals
see [1].
2 A potentialist account of the set-theoretic
universeV
We start with a preliminary lemma motivating the definition of the accessibility
relation we shall consider.
Lemma 2.1. For every transitive set M , for every set a, there exists a transi-
tive set N ⊇M with a ∈ N such that every elementary embedding j : N → N
lifts some elementary embedding j′ : M → M .
Proof. Let M be a transitive set and let a be any set. As shown in [1], there
exists a transitive set N such that M, a ∈ N and M is definable (without
parameters) in N . Thus, M ⊆ N and every j : N → N fixes M , which
implies j“M ⊆ M . Therefore j ↾ M : M → M , and so actually j lifts
j′ = j ↾ M : M →M .
Definition 2.2. Let δ be a Berkeley cardinal.
• Let Mδ = {M : M is transitive ∧ δ ∈M}.
• Let R be the binary relation onMδ defined as follows: for M, N ∈Mδ,
MRN iff M ⊆ N and every elementary embedding j : N → N lifts
some elementary embedding j′ : M → M ; that is, MRN iff M ⊆ N
and for every elementary embedding j : N → N , j ↾ M : M → M .
Note that the assumption that there is a Berkeley cardinal δ and the choice
of Mδ as collection of worlds ensure that every world M admits non-trivial
elementary embeddings j : M →M , so R is not merely reduced to the subset
relation. It is trivial that R is reflexive; also, R is transitive: in fact, if
j : H → H lifts j′ : N → N , which in turn lifts j′′ : M → M , then j
lifts j′′, as j ↾ M = (j ↾ N) ↾ M = j′ ↾ M = j′′. Therefore, 〈Mδ,R〉 is
a potentialist system of ZF-structures. Since Vα ∈ Mδ for any α > δ, we
have that V =
⋃
M∈Mδ
M . Moreover, we show thatMδ provides a potentialist
3
account of the set-theoretic universe V , meaning that every world in Mδ is
a substructure of V and for every M ∈ Mδ and every set a there is a world
N ∈ Mδ accessed by M such that a ∈ N .
Lemma 2.3. Mδ provides a potentialist account of the universe V .
Proof. First, for everyM ∈Mδ, 〈M,∈〉 is a substructure of 〈V,∈〉 (i.e.,M ⊆ V
and ∈M=∈V ↾ M). Further, if M ∈Mδ and a ∈ V , then by Lemma 2.1 there
exists a transitive set N such that {M, a} ∈ N and for every elementary
embedding j : N → N , j ↾ M : M → M . Since δ ∈ M ⊆ N , we have that
N ∈ Mδ; since a ∈ N and N is accessed by M , we are done.
Remark 2.4. Notice that:
1. By Lemma 2.1, for every M ∈ Mδ there exist cofinally many N ∈ Mδ
which are accessed by M , meaning that such N can accommodate any
given set.
2. In particular, for everyM ∈Mδ, for every set a, there exists a rank initial
segment Vα ⊇ M with a ∈ Vα such that every elementary embedding
j : Vα → Vα lifts some elementary embedding j
′ : M → M , that is, such
that Vα is accessed by M .
For any assertion ϕ in the language of ZF, the potentialist translation ϕ⋄ is
the assertion in the potentialist language ZF⋄ (which augments the language
of ZF with the modal operators ♦ and ) achieved by replacing every instance
of ∃x with ♦∃x and every instance of ∀x with ∀x. As an immediate corollary
of Lemma 2.3, we get that truth in V is equivalent to potentialist truth at the
worlds of Mδ.
Corollary 2.5. For any ZF-formula ϕ and for any a0, . . . , an ∈ V , we have:
V |= ϕ(a0, . . . , an) iff M |=Mδ ϕ
⋄(a0, . . . , an),
for any M ∈Mδ in which a0, . . . , an exist.
Let us now state what it precisely means for a modal assertion to be valid with
respect to our potentialist system.
Definition 2.6. A modal assertion ϕ(p0, . . . , pn) in the language of proposi-
tional modal logic is valid at a worldM inMδ for a certain class of assertions,
if all the resulting substitution instances ϕ(ψ0, . . . , ψn), where assertion ψi from
the allowed class is substituted for the propositional variable pi, are true at
M . ϕ is valid in Mδ if it is valid at every world of Mδ.
Of course, the main question arising here is the following:
Question. What is the modal logic of Mδ? That is, which are the modal
principles valid in Mδ?
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3 The modal logic of Mδ
In this section we provide lower and upper bounds on the modal validities of
Mδ, and finally prove that the modal logic of Mδ is exactly S4.2.
Definition 3.1. The modal theory S4 is obtained from the following axioms
by closing under modus ponens and necessitation.
• (K) (ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ)
• (Dual) ¬♦ϕ↔ ¬ϕ
• (S) ϕ→ ϕ
• (4) ϕ→ ϕ
Theorem 3.2. The modal theory S4 is valid at every world of Mδ.
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Proof. Let M ∈Mδ.
• (K). Suppose (ϕ → ψ) and ϕ hold in M . Then, ϕ → ψ and ϕ hold
in any world N accessed by M . Therefore, by modus ponens, ψ holds in
any such N , that is, ψ holds in M .
• (Dual). Immediate.
• (S). Follows immediately from the fact that every world accesses itself.
• (4). If ϕ holds in any world N accessed by M , then so does ϕ, as any
world H accessed by N is also accessed by M .
Definition 3.3. The modal theory S4.2 is obtained from S4 by adding the
axiom (.2) ♦ϕ→ ♦ϕ.
Theorem 3.4. The modal theory S4.2 is valid at every world of Mδ.
Proof. (.2). Let M ∈ Mδ. Assume ♦ϕ holds in M , that is, there exists
N ∈ Mδ such that MRN and ϕ holds in N . Let H ∈ Mδ be such that
MRH . We need to show that ♦ϕ holds in H . Note that there exists a
transitive set K such that 〈N,H〉 is definable in K. Since K is transitive and
N, H ⊆ K, we have that δ ∈ K and so K ∈ Mδ. Now, take any non-trivial
elementary embedding j : K → K. Then, j(N) = N and j(H) = H . So,
j ↾ N : N → N and j ↾ H : H → H . Therefore, N and H both access K.
Since K is accessed by N , K satisfies ϕ; but then, since K is accessed by H
and ϕ holds in K, ♦ϕ holds in H .
2In fact, every potentialist system validates S4.
3Unless otherwise specified, the validities hold for all assertions in ZF⋄, with parameters.
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Theorem 3.4, whose proof actually shows our potentialist system is “conver-
gent” - or “locally directed”4 - and therefore validates (.2), establishes a first
significant lower-bound result. In order to provide upper bounds on the validi-
ties ofMδ, and then determine the exact set of modal principles valid through
the whole system, we recall the definitions of switches, buttons and dials, spe-
cific kinds of control statements first introduced in [5]; in particular, we will
be interested in finding assertions satisfying such definitions which also have
the property of being independent.
Definition 3.5. An assertion s is a switch if both ♦s and ♦¬s are true at
every world, that is, both ♦s and ♦¬s hold. s is a switch at a particular
world M if ♦s and ♦¬s are true at all the worlds accessed by M .
Definition 3.6. A button is a statement b such that ♦b is true at every
world, that is, ♦b holds. The button is pushed at a world if b holds at
that world, and otherwise unpushed.
Definition 3.7. A (possibly infinite) list of statements d0, d1, d2, . . . is a dial
if every world satisfies exactly one of the statements di and every world can
access another world with any prescribed dial value. If a world satisfies di,
then we say that the dial value is i in that world.
Definition 3.8. A family of switches is independent if one can always flip
the truth values of any finitely many of the switches so as to realize any desired
finite pattern of truth.
Definition 3.9. A family of buttons and switches is independent if there
is a world at which the buttons are unpushed, and every world M accesses a
world N in which any additional button may be pushed without pushing any
other as-yet unpushed button from the family, while also setting any finitely
many of the switches so as to have any desired pattern in N ; and similarly
with dials.
Definition 3.10. The modal theory S5 is obtained from S4 by adding the
axiom (5) ♦ϕ→ ϕ, which we call potentialist maximality principle (MP).
The following theorem summarizes some key results - first proved in [5], and
developed further in [3] - we shall use.
Theorem 3.11. The following hold.
1. If W is a Kripke model and a world M ∈ W admits arbitrarily large
finite collections of independent switches, then the propositional modal
assertions valid atM are contained in the modal theory S5. In particular,
4In fact, it shows that whenever MRN and MRH then there exists K such that NRK
and HRK, and so, that Mδ has amalgamation.
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if the switches work throughout W, then the validities of every world of
W, and so the validities of W, are contained within S5.
2. A Kripke modelW admits arbitrarily large finite families of independent
switches if and only if it admits arbitrarily large finite dials.
3. If W is a Kripke model that admits arbitrarily large finite families of
independent buttons and switches, or independent buttons independent
of a dial, then the propositional modal validities of W are contained in
S4.2. The validities of any particular world in which the buttons are not
yet pushed are contained in S4.2, and in any case, are contained in S5.
Theorem 3.12. The propositional modal validities of Mδ are contained in
the modal theory S5.
Proof. It suffices to show that Mδ admits arbitrarily large finite dials. We
shall show that it admits in fact an infinite dial (notice that from an infinite
dial, we can construct finite dials of any given size by keeping any desired finite
number of dial statements and adding the statement that none of them holds).
For i < ω, let di be the assertion that the height of the ordinals is λ+ i, where
λ is a limit ordinal or zero. These statements are expressible in the language
of ZF (without parameters or modal vocabulary), correctly interpreted inside
any transitive set, and so inside any world M ∈ Mδ. Let us show that they
form a dial. First, since any ordinal is uniquely expressed as λ+i for some limit
ordinal λ or zero and some finite i < ω, every world inMδ satisfies exactly one
of the statements di. It remains to prove that every world can access another
world with any desired dial value. Let M ∈Mδ and fix i < ω. Let Vθ be such
that M ⊆ Vθ. Let N = Vθ ∪ tr cl({〈θ,M〉})∪ (θ+ i). Then N ∈Mδ and M is
definable in N , which implies MRN , and the dial value in N is i.
Theorem 3.13. Mδ satisfies exactly S4.2, that is, the modal logic of Mδ is
S4.2.
Proof. We show thatMδ admits arbitrarily large finite families of independent
buttons independent of a dial, which implies that the modal validities of Mδ
are contained in, and hence by Theorem 3.4 equal to, S4.2. For i < ω, let di be
the assertion that the height of the ordinals is λ+ i, where λ is a limit ordinal
or zero; we already showed that these statements form a dial. For m < ω, let
bm be the assertion that the set m · N = {m · k : k < ω} exists; let us show
that these statements are independent buttons independent of the above dial.
Since for every m < ω, if the assertion bm is true in some transitive set then it
will continue to be true in any larger transitive set, each bm is a button. These
buttons are independent because every world M accesses a world N in which
any additional button bm may be pushed without pushing any other as-yet
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unpushed button from the family. Finally, the above buttons and dial values
can be controlled independently of each other.
By Theorem 3.12, S5 is a definite upper bound on the validities of Mδ. An
interesting point would therefore be to determine which worlds of Mδ realize
the maximum set of validities. In other words:
Question. Which worlds ofMδ satisfy the potentialist maximality principle?
4 The worlds satisfying MP
We now give a characterization of the worlds of Mδ satisfying S5. Depending
on the language we consider, we get different criteria. The following concepts
are involved.
Definition 4.1. An ordinal θ is Σn-correct if Vθ ≺Σn V , meaning that Vθ
and V agree on the truth of Σn formulas with parameters from Vθ.
Definition 4.2. A cardinal θ is correct if it is Σn-correct for every n, that
is, if it realizes the scheme Vθ ≺ V .
5
Theorem 4.3. The following are equivalent.
1. The potentialist maximality principle holds in a world M ∈ Mδ for
assertions in the language of ZF with parameters from M .
2. M = Vθ for some Σ2-correct cardinal θ > δ.
Proof. Let M ∈Mδ.
• (1⇒ 2). Assume M satisfies (5) ♦ϕ→ ϕ for assertions in the language
of ZF with parameters from M . First, note that M must be a Vθ with
θ limit. In fact, for all a ∈ M , the existence of the power set of a is
possibly necessary, and it follows that M thinks P(a) exists, and that M
computes the power sets correctly; moreover, M computes Vα correctly
for any ordinal α ∈ M , since the existence of Vα is possibly necessary.
Also, for any set a, it is possibly necessary that a ∈ Vα for some ordinal α,
and so this is already true in M . Now, suppose ϕ(~a) is a Σ2 statement
true in V , with ~a ∈ M . This is witnessed by the existence of some
ordinal α for which Vα satisfies ψ(~a) for some assertion ψ. So, it is
possibly necessary the statement that there is an ordinal α for which Vα
exists and satisfies ψ(~a). Thus, by (5), this statement must be true in
M , and so ϕ(~a) is true in M . Therefore, θ is Σ2-correct.
5Note: this concept is not expressible as a single assertion in the language of set theory,
although it can be expressed as a scheme of statements.
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• (2 ⇒ 1). Assume M = Vθ for θ > δ a Σ2-correct cardinal. Suppose M
satisfies ♦ϕ(~a), ~a ∈ M . Then, there exists N ∈ Mδ accessed by M
that satisfies ϕ(~a). Since ♦ϕ(~a) is a Σ2 statement in V , it must be
true inside M , being M Σ2-correct. So, there exists m ∈ M such that
m satisfies ϕ(~a). Without loss of generality, there exists m = Vα like
this (inside M), and so the smallest one is definable and so it accesses
M . Since the statement that Vα satisfies ϕ(~a) is a Π1 statement, it is
absolute between M and V by the Σ2-correctness of M , and so, it holds
in V . Thus, ϕ(~a) holds in M , which therefore satisfies (5).
Theorem 4.4. The following are equivalent.
1. The potentialist maximality principle holds in a world M ∈ Mδ for
assertions in the potentialist language ZF⋄ with parameters from M .
2. M = Vθ for some correct cardinal θ > δ.
Proof. Let M ∈Mδ.
• (1 ⇒ 2). Assume M satisfies (5) ♦ϕ → ϕ for assertions in the poten-
tialist language ZF⋄ with parameters from M . Then by Theorem 4.3,
M = Vθ for θ Σ2-correct. By the potentialist translation, truth in V is
expressible as ϕ⋄-truth in M . Thus, M can express the statement that
there exists a Σn-correct cardinal (as this is definable in V ). For each n,
this statement is a button in ZF⋄. SoM is a limit of Σn-correct cardinals,
and therefore M is fully correct.
• (2 ⇒ 1). Assume M = Vθ for θ > δ a correct cardinal. Suppose M
satisfies ♦ϕ(~a), where ~a ∈ M and ϕ is a ZF⋄ assertion. Then, there
exists N ∈ Mδ accessed by M that satisfies ϕ(~a). Since the existence
of such a set N and the potentialist semantics are expressible in the
language of set theory, it follows from M ≺ V that there is such a set
inside M . So, there exists m ∈M such that m satisfies ϕ(~a). Without
loss of generality, this m has form Vα, and so the smallest one is definable
and therefore accesses M . Thus, ϕ(~a) holds in M .
Remark 4.5. Note that one can view Theorem 4.4 as a ZF theorem scheme
asserting the equivalence of two schemes; or, one could view it as a theorem of
Go¨del-Bernays set theory augmented with the assumption that there is a pred-
icate for first-order set-theoretic truth (that theory is provable, for example,
in Kelley-Morse set theory).
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5 Consistency of MP and conclusive remarks
Theorem 4.3 and Theorem 4.4 characterize the worlds of Mδ satisfying MP,
respectively, for assertions in the language of set theory and for assertions in
the full potentialist language, with parameters. Let us remark that there exist
indeed such worlds in Mδ. In fact, for the first case, note that by the Le´vy-
Montague reflection theorem (which is a ZF result), the class of all Σ2-correct
cardinals is closed and unbounded in the ordinals. For the second case, observe
that although the existence of a correct cardinal is not provable in ZF, it is
relatively consistent with ZF (see [2]); so, it is relatively consistent with ZF
that there exist worlds in Mδ satisfying MP for assertions in the potentialist
language ZF⋄.
Recall that the definition of our potentialist system leverages on the as-
sumption that there is a Berkeley cardinal δ; one may ask if there is any world
in Mδ which satisfies that there exists a Berkeley cardinal, and the answer
is yes: in fact, the property of being a Berkeley cardinal is Π2, so for any
Σ2-correct cardinal θ, Vθ correctly recognizes the Berkeley cardinals below θ.
In other words, inside all the worlds of Mδ satisfying MP, δ itself is still a
Berkeley cardinal; but these are not the only worlds in Mδ recognizing δ is
Berkeley: in fact, as noted in [1], if δ is a Berkeley cardinal then for all limit
ordinals λ > δ, Vλ thinks that δ is Berkeley.
Finally, since every world M in Mδ can access a Vλ with λ limit, the
assertion ϕBC that there exists a Berkeley cardinal is possible over any M ,
that is, ♦ϕBC holds at every world.
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